The American Politics of Afghanistan

     In Chapter 8 of American Ways, I observed that "Americans view their relations with other countries as more or less extensions of their relations with each other, with typically compatible combinations of self-interests and ideals, so that American foreign policy often has more to do with domestic than with international politics." (p. 281).
      We saw an example of this general trend in American history in the speech that President Donald Trump gave on Monday, August 21, 2017.  The President rejected the policy option of American withdrawal after 16 years of our fighting in Afghanistan and pledged eventual victory there over the Taliban, ISIS, and other terrorist groups.  He did not say how this could be achieved or when.  He did not specify what constituted "victory," but he said that it would depend upon conditions, also not defined, in Afghanistan and not upon some artificial timetable.
     Although the President acted as though his new policy was based on careful analysis of the realities of the Middle East and South Asia, Trump's re-invigorated war in Afghanistan has more to do with domestic than international politics.  It is based primarily on the ideals and self-interests of his political base, upon which he expects to win re-election in 2020.  What are the political appeals of an extended war and the hope of victory in Afghanistan?
     At a very basic level, Trump's war in Afghanistan diverts national attention away from or makes up for domestic political disasters, such as the investigations into Russian meddling in the American elections of 2016, the failure to repeal and replace Obamacare, and the white supremacy mess of Charlottesville.  It's an old political maneuver to shift public attention from divisive domestic to unifying foreign issues. 
     In particular, Trump is arousing the patriotism of national unity that focuses on military might and service values.  Among other demographics, one target is the aging Boomers who painfully remember Vietnam.  They seek a military victory in the future that will compensate for the frustrations of Southeast Asia some half-century ago.  This generation today is prone to hold in contempt those who might be soft on terrorism like those in the past who were seen as being soft on communism.  They believe deeply in teamwork and social cohesion.  Trump gains politically when he convinces people that he is a strong leader who knows how to solve problems with the advice of generals.
     Furthermore, there are young men and women from small towns and rural areas around the country who enlist primarily because the Armed Forces present the best paying jobs to be had.  Their families and neighbors know this, too, and they enthusiastically support the military as the industry that supports their children.
     There certainly are Americans who deeply believe in a strong military to defend liberty and the American way of life against foreign enemies.  They greatly fear ISIS and foreign-generated acts of terrorism in the U.S.  Nobody wants another 9/11.  And along with high ideals often come the self-interests of military patriotism, including the pay and benefits of the military, the revenues of military contractors and suppliers, and the election of representatives in districts and states with military bases and instillations.  Defense has been a strong sector of the American economy, and a strong economy provides strong politics.   
     Trump is probably correct in his expectations that some kind of military success in Afghanistan could be called "victory" and leveraged for political gain.  On the other hand, he is tempting the same fate of other nations and leaders who have tried and failed to extend their foreign policy goals into this region of the world, including the British and Russians over the last two centuries.

(C) 2017 Stephen M. Millett (All rights reserved)